Thinking Outside the Dichotomy

Adam Smith's conceptual sleight-of-hand on exchange, cooperation, and the foundations of social order      

This was a response to one section of a post by Brad DeLong containing Snippets: Smith, Marx, Solow: Shoebox for Econ 210a Spring 2014.  My attention was caught by the first snippet in this compilation.  It posed the question "Exchange and its vicissitudes as fundamental to human psychology and society?" and followed that with a justly famous quotation from Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations.  As usual, Brad's question zeroed in on some crucial issues.  I was provoked to start writing a message about some of those issues, which I thought would run a few lines ... but it turned out to be a little longer, so I might as well share it.   —Jeff Weintraub

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Hi Brad,

Your post with Snippets: Smith, Marx, Solow: Shoebox for Econ 210a Spring 2014 ("Exchange and its vicissitudes as fundamental to human psychology and society?") begins by quoting one of Smith's most theoretically important passages in The Wealth of Nations. That passage (from the second chapter in Book I of WN) also contains one of Smith's most impressive, and cleverly deceptive, bits of conceptual and rhetorical sleight-of-hand. Too many readers, including quite sophisticated ones, uncritically accept this conceptual sleight-of-hand and take it at face value. Perhaps even Brad DeLong is one of them?   I notice that you actually collude in the deception (no doubt unintentionally) by selectively quoting from that passage.

Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog.... When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man or of another animal, it has no other means of persuasion but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours by a thousand attractions to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civilised society he stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons....

[M]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love....

 Let's start with those dogs, since that's where the deceptive argumentation begins, and a more careful examination of what Smith says about dogs already begins to undermine his carefully constructed dichotomy.  Sure, it's probably true that nobody ever saw two dogs exchange bones of equivalent value.  (Why would they want to do that?)  But so what?  That point is just a distraction from the real question.  The central agenda of this passage is to argue that the only two ways to get help or assistance from someone else are (a) self-interested exchange or (b) an appeal to their "benevolence" by begging and "fawning".  Let's forget humans for a moment.  Is that second option the only way dogs ever do it?  

Smith wants us to think the answer is yes, but the answer is obviously no.  To see why, we should pay attention to what happens in the three sentences immediately preceding the quotation.  Smith, in effect, denies that dogs (and presumably other canines) hunt in packs. If you think I'm making that up, go back and re-read the relevant sentences.

Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert.  Each turns her toward his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her toward himself.  This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular time.  [my boldings]

No, dogs don't trade one bone for another. But dogs and other animals definitely do cooperate (not just in pairs, but in packs) in obtaining things they could not obtain, or achieving things they could not achieve, as individuals. In the process of cooperation, they help each other out.  And they regularly do so in ways that do not involve market exchange (or servile fawning).

It's probably correct to say that two dogs pursuing a hare together haven't made a "contract" (that would depend, in part, on precisely what Smith means by "contract" here). But is that logically equivalent to claiming, as Smith implies by a cunning conceptual slide, that the two dogs aren't really acting in "concert"? A moment's reflection should be sufficient to make the answer embarrassingly obvious.

OK, perhaps Smith didn't know dogs that well.  (Actually, I suspect that's not so, but let's just concede the possibility.)  But humans can hunt in packs, too, and do lots of other things in packs. Humans act in concert all the time, in ways that are not based on trucking and bartering. That may seem like an obvious fact, once it's pointed out ... but a major purpose of Smith's discussion in the first several pages of that chapter is to obscure the theoretical significance of this obvious fact.

Why would Smith want to obscure that conceptual point?

We don't need to try to read Smith's mind, but we do know that Smith is a careful analytical system-builder and a writer of great rhetorical skill and sophistication.  (His writings on rhetoric are justly admired.)  And one can't help noticing that obscuring, or evading, that conceptual point serves a useful function in helping Smith lay the foundations for his core theoretical argument in WN.

As I've already noted, Smith tries hard to convey the impression that the only significant basis for sustained mutually beneficial interaction between individuals is self-interested exchange, which on the one side is rooted in certain basic impulses or motivations built into human nature (self-interest + the impulse to exchange), and on the other side gives rise (unintentionally but intelligibly) to a dynamic system of self-interested exchange (the market) with its own distinctive laws & dynamics. Smith further suggests that the only possible alternative basis for (intermittent) mutual aid or beneficial interaction is gratuitous "benevolence" or (to use a later, 19th-century, word) altruism.

But that's a false dichotomy, since it implicitly rules out other bases for concerted action and mutually beneficial interaction that do, indeed, play significant roles in real life.

What am I getting at? Well, let's review the first sentence from the second paragraph you quoted:

[M]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only.

Yes, man (or human) does have constant needs for coordinated action, mutually beneficial interaction, and assistance from others. (So do wolves.) And it's true that gratuitous altruism or "benevolence" cannot serve as the only basis for them, quite aside from the fact that constantly wheedling other people for favors or handouts is demeaning. But are those really the only two alternatives? No, of course not. This is a cleverly constructed, and rhetorically effective, false dichotomy.

Let me step back and point out that, in the most basic analytical terms, there are at least three ways to achieve sustained coordination of human actions (even if we just ignore "benevolence" for the moment).

(1)  One obvious possibility is top-down command, or what we might euphemistically term "imperative coordination" (to use Parsons's idiosyncratic and somewhat bowdlerizing translation of Weber's Herrschaft). And in fact this mode of coordination turns up right in Chapter 1 of Book I of WN, since that is precisely how the the division of labor within the famous pin factory is instituted and run. Yes, the rest of WN goes on to show how it is possible to have an effective division of labor (i.e., dynamic systems of simultaneous differentiation and coordination) without the necessity for conscious top-down coordination based on command—i.e., a division of labor can be coordinated by the impersonal system of the self-regulating market—and that's a brilliant and profound theoretical achievement. But we shouldn't forget that domination or authority play a role, too. And, to repeat, the coordination of action within Smith's pin factory (or any other formal organization) is not based, in principle, on either gratuitous "benevolence" or the self-interested exchange of commodities.

(Marx, of course, hammers that point home with his analysis of the two complementary forms of the division of labor in the capitalist mode of production, and brilliantly spells out some of the implications.)

(2)  A second possible mode of coordinating human action is through the market—i.e., an impersonal, dynamic, and self-regulating system of self-interested exchange. Let's be conceptually clear and precise here. Smith's point about how the market operates as a system is that it allows tens, thousands, or millions of people to be connected in chains of mutually beneficial interaction without having to consciously coordinate their actions or reach agreements about them, without having to care about what those other people need or want, without even knowing they exist. In so far as those millions of mutual strangers "cooperate" in the market system, that "cooperation" is purely functional and metaphorical. In fact, the beauty of the market is precisely that it allows for systematic and beneficial coordination without the need for either conscious cooperation or conscious top-down "imperative coordination" (i.e., domination).

(3)  But that brings us to a third possible mode of coordinating human action, which is conscious cooperation. Humans can sometimes manage to pursue joint or common ends, not through the indirect mechanisms of self-interested exchange of commodities, nor by simultaneously submitting to a common superior who directs and coordinates their actions (the Hobbesian solution), but by engaging in concerted action guided by common agreement, custom, habituation, etc.. Not only can humans do it, even dogs and wolves can do it—despite what Smith's second paragraph in Chapter 2 of Book I of WN might seem to imply.

Conscious cooperation, by the way, is not identical to gratuitous "benevolence" or altruism. It may draw on emotions of fellow-feeling or solidarity (those frequently help), but it may also entail quite hard-headed calculations of material advantage and instrumental rationality. But the point is that, in this context, the interests of the participants can be pursued, not through exchange, but through actual (not virtual) cooperation. Furthermore, humans sometimes manage to build up complex systems for enabling large-scale and sophisticated forms of cooperation, including institutional mechanisms for collective deliberation and decision-making, representation, etc.

(In the real world, many human practices and institutions involve more or less complex mixtures of elements from more than one of those categories, or even from all three. But for the sake of conceptual clarity, and to avoid the characteristic conceptual obfuscations, it's useful to begin by laying out those ideal-typical analytical distinctions sharply. To pretend, or imply, or even tacitly insinuate that option #2 is the only way to coordinate human activity in sustained and beneficial ways—and that the only conceivable alternative is gratuitous "benevolence"—is self-evidently wrong.)

And as long as we're on the subject of the tacit exclusions underlying Smith's foundational false dichotomy, let me mention just one more factor. Smith suggests in the passage you quoted that if we want someone else to do something that might be necessary or beneficial for us, there are two kinds of motivation, and only two kinds of motivation, that we might appeal to. We can appeal either to their individual self-interest or to their disinterested benevolence. Well, in the real world, we often make claims or recommendations, or have expectations that we regard as sensible and legitimate, based on people's obligations (moral, legal, customary, religious, or whatever). Obligations are not individual psychological characteristics, but socially structured norms, and they are not simply reducible to motivations of generalized "benevolence" or of the calculation of individual self-interest. (Of course, some people might want to argue for reducing them to the latter—those would be the kinds of "rational actor" obsessives who would tautologically reduce everything to calculations of individual self-interest—but I don't think I need to spell out to you the reasons why that won't work.  Life is more complicated than that.) Also, it so happens that systems of obligation are of fundamental importance in shaping and coordinating all modes and areas of human social life, from what Smith calls the "early and rude state of society" up to the present. (I suppose that's a Durkheimian point, though it might also be treated as Burkean or Polanyian.)

=>  OK, I could go on ... but that should be sufficient to get the main points across.

Smith might well want to make the argument that coordinating human action through the market, based on the motivations and practices of self-interested exchange (and their indirect and unintended consequences), is (generally speaking, and all things being equal) better and more efficient than coordinating human action through domination, conscious coordination, obligation, etc. And one could certainly find strong and plausible grounds for that argument (though I confess to having a soft spot for conscious coordination, where practicable).

However, such an argument would be different from the explicit argument that Smith actually does make in the passage you quoted—i.e., that the only significant basis for the sustained and mutually beneficial coordination of human action is self-interested market exchange ... and that the only conceivable alternative would be the throw-away residual category of gratuitous "benevolence" (which present-day mainstream economists usually shove into the even-more-grab-bag residual category of "altruism"). The argument that Smith actually makes there is incorrect, is based on an obvious false dichotomy ... and has proved to be a brilliantly successful and convincing piece of rhetorical and conceptual sleight-of hand. We should admire the brilliance, but we shouldn't be taken in.

=> Nor is this a peripheral or merely technical point. One of the central arguments that runs through and structures Smith's whole discussion in Books I-II of WN is that the market (based on the built-in human motivations and "natural" practices of self-interested exchange) is not just one important basis of social order, but is the fundamental basis of social order (and of the main tendencies of long-term socio-historical development). That's what it means to treat "exchange and its vicissitudes as fundamental to human psychology and society".

Again, that's a brilliant, powerful, and fascinating theoretical argument. But it's wrong ... and swallowing it uncritically has led many very intelligent people astray.

The Crux of the Issue

From Marriage Equality USA:
The debate over the freedom to marry is about the right to enter into the state-created institution of civil marriage only. After all, marriage is a civil right and two consenting adults should be allowed to enter into the institution if they so choose.
Unlike some religious definitions, civil definitions of marriage do not usually mention childbearing, sexual relations, living arrangements, or religious belief/observance.
When clergy or congregations marry couples it is a religious rite, not a civil ceremony, though the government may recognize it. Clergy and congregations choose whom they marry. They aren't compelled to accept the state's marriage definition, and indeed, many religious institutions don't accept it. Many religious institutions are more restrictive than the state, rejecting interfaith marriages or remarriages after divorce. Some have a broader definition, blessing the unions of same-gender couples. (Marriage Equality USA would like to thank Interfaith Working Group for this passage.)

In the U.S., a marriage is only legal with the signing of a marriage license. That is why many opposite-sex couples can go to a judge or any other public officiant and need not go to a church, synagogue or mosque. Our government has made the process simpler by allowing religious leaders to perform a religious wedding AND to act as a civil officiant. Each religious leader must sign the civil license before witnesses and the couple for the marriage to be legal. In Europe, couples MUST go before a public official to marry. A religious ceremony is 'secondary' and optional -- only occurring if the couple wishes to have one.
This fact is important to note because many same-sex couples are simply interested in the government's acknowledgement of their relationship. We are not asking for any religion to accept our marriages, although, many religious institutions throughout our country do.

• Civil and religious marriage are not the same thing. Many religious faiths already recognize religious unions or marriages between same-sex couples, even though such unions are not recognized by the government.
• Individual congregations of Reform Jews, American Baptists, Buddhists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Unitarian Universalists, Methodists, the Society of Friends and the United Church of Christ have performed marriages for same-sex couples.
• Even after civil marriage becomes available to same-sex couples, religions will retain the right to decide for themselves whether to perform or recognize any marriage, just as they already do. No court decision or legislative enactment can change the basic tenets of religious faith. For example, some religions will not marry someone who has already been divorced, although the person is free to marry civilly. We respect the right of a faith to decide for itself what marriages it will embrace.

History Lesson

This is pretty cool.  It's an animated history map of the growth of the United States.

Heroic Efforts

Just a day after a tornado in Edmond sent us to my parents' storm shelter, another much bigger and much more violent tornado hit Moore, Oklahoma, 22 miles south of us.  The tornado hit two elementary schools, and seven children died in the basement of one of them. This is the fifth major tornado to hit Moore since 1998. 
    I was asleep while all this was going on.  Gaby was watching the coverage when I got up, and we had two different channels on two different TVs going for several hours.  As my friend Mark said on Facebook, " This is like watching the 9/11/01 coverage. I want to turn it off but feel honor bound to watch it, you know?"
I personally couldn't post anything on Facebook.  The normal politico-economic stuff that usuall interests me just lost its flavor.  Even the project I worked on last night, which I would love to show off normally, because it's turning out really good, just didn't seem approprate.  I 'liked' some others' posts, but I just didn't have words that someone else hadn't already said.
      I particularly related to something my friend Becca said which was that she really wished she could actually be there to dig through the rubble, just to feel she was actually doing something.  It turned out, though, that she did have an outlet.  She's the Chairman of the Blue Energy Commitee at the hotel, and she spent the day compiling a list of volenteers for Feed The Children, and was an integral part in organizing the donations sent from the hotel.  So she got to be a heroine after all.   
    We needed to go to the grocery store today, and I had seen on Facebook a list of items that were needed to be donated, so I decided to pick up some of those as well.  Somehow I got very emotionally involved with this particular trip to the store.  I managed to control myself, but every time I saw someone go by with a cart loaded up with diapers and bottled water, I could have burst out crying right there in the store.  It was a totally unexpected reaction.
    We took our donations to one of the local TV stations, where Becca had told me a Feed The Children truck was located.  Three guys there separated our stuff out to pallettes loaded with like items.  I felt inadequate.  But time and money are not in great supply at our house, and I could have used that as an excuse to sit at home and do nothing.  I guess I should be satisfied that I did not.

Crushed/Crush

So, Jason Collins of the NBA comes out the other day, and in the middle of all this positive feedback he's getting, Chris Broussard, an ESPN basketball analyst, gives a dissenting and critical opinion on the air.  A friend of a friend on Facebook posted that video and voiced agreement and support for Broussard, and somehow it showed up in my newsfeed. 
    As I watched it, a couple of things stood out.  For one thing, he kept talking about the "gay lifestyle", which is just wrong, in the same way that talking about the "left-handed lifestyle" is just wrong.  But what I commented on was his equating being gay with having sex, to which the original poster responded, "Are you actually gay if you don't have homosexual sex?"
    It's astonishing to me that in a time when an understanding of the nature of being gay is becoming rather mainstream that there are still people out there who regard being gay as a behavior.  Even my own Congressional Representative thinks of it that way.  But I answered the question by telling some of my own story, because in many ways, especially the age of self discovery thing, I'm pretty typical.  (I stayed in the closet a lot longer than most, but that's another story.)  But answering that question made me wonder about the experience of some of my friends, so I asked a few of them a series of questions.
    The first question was When did you know?, and by that I meant, when did you know you were attracted to people of the same sex?  For me, it was around the first grade, when I was six.  Two guys told me they knew when they were five.  One young lady told me that the revelation came in stages, but she had her first "serious" girlfriend when she was eleven.  A fellow at work told me he was in his teens.
    The second question was When did you know that you were different?  It was a difficult question to phrase succinctly because it encompassed the idea that while one may know (he) finds (boys) attractive, (he) may not have any knowledge of the concept of  'gay'.  One said he knew right away (he's younger), while another said it was three years later.  It was four years later for me.
    That knowledge came to me one sunny morning on the playground at my grade school.  I was sitting on the stoop of one of the portable classrooms when a sixth-grader, one year ahead of me, asked me if I ever kissed my brother.  We were an affectionate family, so I said yes.  He said, "That means you're a fag, because only fags kiss other boys."
    It was a stunning revelation.  "It" had a name, and I was "it".  And "it" was bad.  And the notion that it was bad was reinforced by my peers for many years after.
    And it wasn't about kissing my brother --that part was complete nonsense.  It was about whose attention I wanted, and who I wanted to look at, and why I felt so utterly different from every other boy in my school.  And this new knowledge affected my self image and self esteem for the next three decades.
    Question three was, do you remember the name of your first crush, and how old were you?  I asked this question to a few people at work as well, most of them straight, and was amused that, gay or straight, most of the crushes occured about the same time of life, in kindergarten or early grade school.  And the question brought a smile to everyone's face.
    My first crush was a kid in my second grade class named Kent Malave.  He was Argentinian, and had an older brother named Ted, who I still see around town on occasion.  During our third grade year their family had moved back to Argentina, but Kent was back for fourth grade.  He came over to my house once that year, which thrilled me to no end.
    Kent had Mrs. Robinson as his fourth grade teacher and I had Mrs. Clark, but I had Mrs. Robinson for my reading class, and I sat at Kent's desk.  I wrote him a message in pencil for Valentine's Day that covered half his desk.  He was not happy, since he was the one who had to clean it off.
    I saw him at the hotel about three years ago.  His hair was completely white, and shorter, and he was no longer wearing those teardrop shaped glasses with the lenses that got dark when he stepped out into the sunlight.  His beauty had faded a bit.  Age does that sometimes.  I wish we'd had the chance to talk, but I was working, and he was part of a large party that was leaving.
    There were other boys I liked in  grade school:  David Sims, Kirk Neimeyer, Grant Hartzog, Steve Parduhn, Larry Ethridge. I was the dorky kid with the bad haircut, the bad jokes, the strange clothes, and the obsession with the Osmond Brothers (and, yes, I know I'm showing my age.)  One more thing to make me different was all I needed.
    It took me decades to figure out that deciding to be gay or straight was like deciding to be right or left handed.  There's only so much one's will-power can accomplish.  And the closet is a very bad place to be.  At some point in your life, you have to decide to be happy.
    So congratulations, Jason.  I think you'll find that the freedom of living without fear is worth a lot more than someone else's opinion.

It's What You Scatter

Sent to me in an email from my Dad:

I was at the corner grocery store buying some early potatoes... I noticed a small boy, delicate of bone and feature, ragged but clean, hungrily appraising a basket of freshly picked green peas.
I paid for my potatoes but was also drawn to the display of fresh green peas. I am a pushover for creamed peas and new potatoes.
Pondering the peas, I couldn't help overhearing the conversation between Mr. Miller (the store owner) and the ragged boy next to me.

'Hello Barry, how are you today?'

'H'lo, Mr. Miller. Fine, thank ya. Jus' admirin' them peas. They sure look good'

'They are good, Barry. How's your Ma?'
'Fine. Gittin' stronger alla' time.'
'Good. Anything I can help you with?'
'No, Sir. Jus' admirin' them peas.'
'Would you like to take some home?' asked Mr. Miller.

'No, Sir. Got nuthin' to pay for 'em with.'

'Well, what have you to trade me for some of those peas?'

'All I got's my prize marble here.'

'Is that right? Let me see it', said Miller..

'Here 'tis. She's a dandy.'

'I can see that. Hmm mmm, only thing is this one is blue and I sort of go for red. Do you have a red one like this at home?' the store owner asked.

'Not zackley but almost.'

'Tell you what... Take this sack of peas home with you and next trip this way let me look at that red marble'. Mr. Miller told the boy.

'Sure will. Thanks Mr. Miller.'


Mrs. Miller, who had been standing nearby, came over to help me. With a smile she said, 'There are two other boys like him in our community, all three are in very poor circumstances. Jim just loves to bargain with them for peas, apples, tomatoes, or whatever.
When they come back with their red marbles, and they always do, he decides he doesn't like red after all and he sends them home with a bag of produce for a green marble or an orange one, when they come on their next trip to the store.'

I left the store smiling to myself, impressed with this man. A short time later I moved to Colorado , but I never forgot the story of this man, the boys, and their bartering for marbles.

Several years went by, each more rapid than the previous one. Just recently I had occasion to visit some old friends in that Idaho community and while I was there learned that Mr. Miller had died. They were having his visitation that evening and knowing my friends wanted to go, I agreed to accompany them. Upon arrival at the mortuary we fell into line to meet the relatives of the deceased and to offer whatever words of comfort we could.

Ahead of us in line were three young men. One was in an army uniform and the other two wore nice haircuts, dark suits and white shirts...all very professional looking... They approached Mrs. Miller, standing composed and smiling by her husband's casket.

Each of the young men hugged her, kissed her on the cheek, spoke briefly with her and moved on to the casket. Her misty light blue eyes followed them as, one by one; each young man stopped briefly and placed his own warm hand over the cold pale hand in the casket. Each left the mortuary awkwardly, wiping his eyes.

Our turn came to meet Mrs. Miller. I told her who I was and reminded her of the story from those many years ago and what she had told me about her husband's bartering for marbles. With her eyes glistening, she took my hand and led me to the casket.

'Those three young men who just left were the boys I told you about.

They just told me how they appreciated the things Jim 'traded' them. Now, at last, when Jim could not change his mind about color or size......they came to pay their debt.'

'We've never had a great deal of the wealth of this world,' she confided, 'but right now, Jim would consider himself the richest man in Idaho...'

With loving gentleness she lifted the lifeless fingers of her deceased husband. Resting underneath were three exquisitely shined red marbles.

The Moral:
We will not be remembered by our words, but by our kind deeds. Life is not measured by the breaths we take, but by the moments that take our breath.

 

Oo-ooh That Smell

Paul Krugman directs us to a pdf file of a book called The Great Stink of London by Stephen Halliday, which chronicals the debate over construction of a sewer system in London in the mid 19th century.  The quote he chose was one in which The Economist, a publication that is still being printed, stated that the suffering caused by lack of a sewer system was divinely ordained.  While that quote was interesting enough to repost to my Facebook page, it was a later paragraph that really caught my eye:

"A question to Oxford about its plans for obtaining a clean and economical supply of water drew the answer 'never, and not likely to until compelled by Parliamentary interposition.'  Dr. John Snow, who hypothesised that cholera epidemics were water-borne, drew attention to the problems which arose from such attitudes while addressing the Social Science Congress in Bristol in 1849.  He stated that 'our present machinery must be greatly enlarged, radically altered and endowed with new powers,' above all with the power of 'doing away with that form of liberty to which some communities cling, the sacred power to poison to death not only themselves but their neighbors.'"

The reason I noticed it was because it reminded me of  a few years ago when Governor Rick Perry of Texas was battling with the EPA over pollutants produced by oil refineries.  EPA regulations were expected to "... improve air quality for an estimated 240 million Americans, preventing a projected 30,000 premature deaths and up to 15,000 nonfatal heart attacks, as well as hundreds of thousands of cases of asthma and other respiratory ailments."  A hyperbolic comparison of the time said that when Saddam Hussein poisons his people, it's called genocide.  If Rick Perry does it, it's called 'state's rights.'

Elsewhere on my reading list, for the past several days a lot is being written about Paul Ryan's new budget, which thematically isn't that different than his old budgets, though updated for current events, so none of the econobloggers is really saying anything different than what they've been saying since 2010.  Two exceptions:  the Onion made fun of Ryan's youthful appearance, and Dana Milbank compared the budget to a Mad Lib.  It was clever enough that I decided to try it for myself with Gaby giving the answers.
    Gaby is from Mexico.  Apparently they don't have Mad Libs in Mexico.
    After a short explanation, I asked him first for an adjective, and then all the rest.  The result:

The former Republican vice presidential candidate’s budget eliminates skinny loopholes in the tax code, cutting the needle and the fish deductions. It reduces spending on the rose program by 69% and the glass program by 21%. Retirees would see paddling, students would experience pedaling and the poor would be cut.